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I. INTRODUCTION
We stand at a critical crossroads. The growth in the total number of
scholars of color and in the number of places that are beginning to have a
critical mass of scholars of color has begun to reap dividends in terms of
a scholarship that is centered on the concerns of people of color. These
black scholars have given voice to the interests of people who were al-
ways at the margin of the central legal discourse, even when their inter-
ests and rights were at the heart of the debate taking place in courts and
legal scholarship. Is it possible to make this scholarship that has been
written partially to other scholars of color accessible to majority schol-
ars? Can we make white scholars hear the stories that black scholars are
telling? My answer to this question is a definite "maybe." White schol-
ars may listen to what scholars of color are saying, but what they hear is
not always what scholars of color speak. In order for white scholars to
hear, they must change what they do.
II. THE NATURE OF STORIES
Not all stories are born equal, or put differently, stories that are
written for the wrong audience will not be understood. We recently
heard a version of this problem in the programming for Saturday morn-
ing children's TV. It turns out that little girls will watch TV programs
with boys as heroes, but that little boys refuse to watch TV programs
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with girls as heroes. I Accordingly, much of Saturday morning TV is full
of male stories, and there are few heroines. Like the little boys of the
American viewing public, majority scholars often refuse to hear the sto-
ries that are being told in the scholarship of legal scholars of color.
There are three reasons for this failure to hear that are similar to the
problems of boys and TV. First, majority scholars2 refuse to read the
works of scholars of color, particularly if the works deviate from the
pattern of scholarship that majority scholars have undertaken.3 Second,
even when they read the works of scholars of color-primarily when it is
most traditional in form and content-majority scholars often misstate
the premises and the objectives of that scholarship. Third, majority
scholars often hear the story told by scholars of color as a kind of shrill
craziness that does not meet the standards of any "reasonable" scholar-
ship. All three of these reasons are deeply embedded in the structure of
legal scholarship and all ultimately are a product of the reaction of ma-
jority scholars to the story told by scholars of color.
I will first describe the stories told by scholars of color that majority
scholars will listen to, and explain why those stories have resonance. I
will then explain why other stories told by black scholars have such a
difficult hearing and why white scholars often do not read or pay atten-
tion to the work of scholars of color.
III. THREE DIFFERENT STORIES: AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND RACE AND
CULTURE
For many in legal education, two recent books, by Stephen Carter
and Patricia Williams, are polar opposites.' I believe, however, that it is
important to understand the extent to which these two books are in fact
mirror images of each other. At their hearts, they are both autobio-
graphical descriptions of experiences in the legal academy. In their use
of autobiography, we can see the similarities and differences between two
approaches to the interaction of race with legal education and why some
1. Charles Solomon, 'Mermaid' Dives Into Saturday Morning, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at
Fl, F8 ("Girl characters regularly appear on shows that focus on groups of kids, but they're usually
relegated to secondary roles. Saturday morning cartoons have remained a boy's club because studies
have shown that little girls will watch shows about male characters, but little boys won't watch
programs about females."); Byron Reeves & M. Mark Miller, A Multidimensional Measure of Chil-
dren's Identification with Television Characters, J. BROADCASTING, Winter 1978, at 71. I do not
mean to suggest that such views need to predominate. Some have found that there has been a
change in these views over time. See, e.g., LISA A. LEwis, GENDER, POLITICS, AND MTV: VOICING
THE DIFFERENCE 200-24 (1990) (describing how women rock singers have used cable television to
subvert perspectives on women and what women want).
2. I will use the term "majority scholars" as a way of capturing the essentially white male
professorate of American law schools. In that sense, it is a political grouping and not simply a
description of genetic phenotypes.
3. See Richard Delgado, Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outside Writing Ten
Years Later, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992).
4. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); PA-
TRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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find the story of one more easy to accept than the other. Perhaps most
importantly, these efforts to use autobiography to reconfigure and recon-
struct American consciousness stand within the foremost part of the lit-
erary contribution of African-Americans to American culture.'
Susanna Egan has suggested that there are four primary patterns
used by authors in writing autobiography that correspond roughly to
various stages of the life of the autobiographer or the age that the autobi-
ographer is describing.6 The first pattern, "paradise," appears in the
work of autobiographers who write about their youth, typically hypothe-
sizing some Edenic sanctuary that the youth is forced by age and experi-
ence to leave. 7 The second pattern is the "journey" or quest for self-
knowledge or lost time.' The third pattern is the "conversion," a trial in
some difficult place through which the quester is able to gain special
knowledge and eventual redemption.9 The final pattern of autobiogra-
phy, "confession," is a mature form of autobiography, often done at the
very end of life, that does not follow the others in form or seem to have
as its basis a simplistic formula.' 0
Professor Egan's descriptions of autobiography are helpful in talk-
ing and thinking about how to approach these two books, because one
used extensively the first three patterns of autobiography that Egan out-
lined and the other did not. Professor Carter's autobiography is almost a
textbook example of the patterns that Professor Egan described as tradi-
tional in autobiography. Professor Carter recounted an Edenic child-
hood spent as a "fac-brat" that racism occasionally interrupted."1 This
5. See, e.g., William L. Andrews, Introduction, in AFRICAN AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: A
COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 1 (William L. Andrews ed., 1992).
Autobiography holds a position of priority, indeed many would say preeminence, among the
narrative traditions of black America....
[Since] the eighteenth-century slave narrator who first sang into print the "long black
song[,]"... African American autobiography has testified to the ceaseless commitment of peo-
ple of color to realize the promise of their American birthright and to articulate their achieve-
ments as individuals and as persons of African descent. Perhaps more than any other literary
form in black American letters, autobiography has been recognized and celebrated since its
inception as a powerful means of addressing and altering sociopolitical as well as cultural reali-
ties in the United States.
Id. For a recent compilation of such stories, see BEARING WITNESS: SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN-
AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Henry L. Gates ed., 1991).
6. See SUSANNA EGAN, PATTERNS OF EXPERIENCE IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3-13 (1984).
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Id. at4.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8-9.
11. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black and Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, 1990, at
6. Professor Carter recalls:
My father taught at Cornell, which made me a Cornell kid, a "fac-brat," and I hung out
with many of the other Cornell kids in a private little world where we competed fiercely (but
only with one another-no one else mattered!) for grades and test scores and solutions to brain
teasers.
... And when I decided that I wanted to attend Stanford University, I was told by [a]
guidance counselor that I would surely be admitted because I was black and I was smart. Not
because I was smart alone, not even because I was smart and black, but because I was black and
smart: always, the skin color preceding any other observation.
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description, at its heart, fits within the pattern of youthful descriptions of
life found in most autobiographies. In Professor Williams's description
of her childhood, we see the reality of her life, not as a past Eden, but
rather in places as a bleak and dreary past of hardship and racial
oppression.
Much of Professor Carter's book is a description of his journey from
student to faculty member. In that journey we see the struggle in which
he has engaged, but we also see clearly the theme of the goodness of
society that such descriptions ultimately validate. 12 What many take
from Professor Carter's journey is the notion that if he can make the trip,
why not other blacks?13 Many also hear his description of his past as the
most important indictment of affirmative action and race conscious poli-
cies. Professor Carter tried to obliquely reject that interpretation in his
book, but he ultimately failed to do so, precisely because his story reso-
nates with the image of the privileged black person who has benefited
from unfair advantage and now has been converted to the truth and
power of the color-blind society.
This view of the story told by Professor Carter is consistent with
what David Howard-Pitney has called the Afro-American Jeremiad. t4
This jeremiad is a variant on the American jeremiad that sees Americans
as a chosen people who will use the problems of today to spur them on to
a greater destiny. Part of the Afro-American tradition has been to turn
this American story into one about Afro-Americans that sees them as
chosen among the chosen. The story that many colleagues hear Profes-
sor Carter tell is consistent with that aspect of the story of Afro-Ameri-
cans. It is like Martin Luther King's "I have a Dream" speech and
Thurgood Marshall's reminder, upon the two-hundredth anniversary of
the Constitution, that the Civil War amendments transformed the origi-
nal document by bringing blacks within the phrase "We the people."' 5
Professor Carter engaged in a conversion-from naive student radi-
cal to hard-edged and practical meritocratic professor of law. Other
black Americans have been confused by their stories and the impact of
race, but Professor Carter recognized the power of society, if it tries, to
become better and fairer. Nevertheless, the reason that Senator Spector
raised Professor Carter's book on national television during the Clarence
Id.
12. A number of people have told me that they have interpreted my article on autobiography
in this light. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography, and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding
the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991). I did not intend it that way, but since I do
use some of Professor Egan's patterns in that work I understand why some hear it that way.
13. I do not believe that this is how Professor Carter would like to have his message inter-
preted, but I believe that this is implicit in the way he describes the situation and presents his life as
an example.
14. DAVID HOWARD-PITNEY, THE AFRO-AMERICAN JEREMIAD: APPEALS FOR JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 3-34 (1990).
15. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Celebrating the Constitution: A Dissent, HARPER'S MAG., July
1987, at 17, 17-18; see also HOWARD-PITNEY, supra note 14, at 138-51.
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Thomas hearings is that many who read the book conclude that Profes-
sor Carter's conversion was to the current system and its values. In our
society, if one is to be converted and thus understood, it had better be to
some version of the status quo.
Alchemy of Race and Rights is different because it fits the pattern of
much of the recent work of women and people of color in its opposition
to the current system. Professor Williams's book is much more a form of
confession. This is clear from the subtitle, Diary of a Law Professor. Di-
aries and confessions do not fit as easily into the traditional framework of
stories. Her story is more of a challenge to the reader to appreciate not
the form but the substance of life. It is to this appreciation and decon-
struction of traditional categories of writing that much of the work of
black authors, particularly black women authors, is directed. 16 Professor
Williams's work is accordingly much less under the control of the tradi-
tional approaches of white scholars to the stories of black people.
It should not surprise us that Professor Carter's book has found a
much warmer response among the popular organs of traditional media
power and has been promoted by the academic powers that be. Professor
Carter's message was first printed as an "op. ed." piece in the Wall Street
Journal 17 and then as an article in Reconstruction.8 After publication,
the New York Times Book Review devoted its cover review in its first fall
issue to the book 9 and the New York Times published an excerpt as an
"op. ed." piece.2" Professor Williams's book has ultimately won wide
acclaim across a number of disciplines, but it has been critically reviewed
in the main in law reviews rather than the important papers of the status
16. Black writers are constantly trying to change how people are represented.
But militancy is an alternative to madness. And many of us are daily entering the realm of the
insane.
Clare [heroine of Nella Larson's Passing] boldly declares that she would rather live for
the rest of her life as a poor black woman in Harlem than as a rich white matron downtown. I
asked the class to consider the possibility that to love blackness is dangerous in a white suprem-
acist culture--so threatening, so serious a breach in the fabric of the social order, that death is
the punishment.
BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 6, 9 (1992).
We who have been oppressed and silenced-especially those of us who suffer from the
"traumata of insignificance" . . . because we belong to insular "minorities" from some of the
smallest countries of our planet-will never be tempted by the illusions of leadership, will never
be deluded into thinking that we can represent anyone but ourselves.
FRANCOISE LIONNET, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL VOICES: RACE, GENDER, SELF-PORTRAITURE 6
(1989); see also WILLIAM L. ANDREWS, To TELL A FREE STORY: THE FIRST CENTURY OF AFRO-
AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 1760-1865 (Illini Books 1988) (detailing how black slaves used auto-
biography to debate and question their status); HOUSTON A. BAKER, JR., WORKINGS OF THE
SPIRIT: THE POETICS OF AFRO-AMERICAN WOMEN'S WRITING (1991) (discussing how Afro-Amer-
ican women have altered the terms of the debate by reconfiguring the notions of power, gender, and
race).
17. Stephen L. Carter, Racial Preferences? So Wat?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1989, at A20.
18. Carter, supra note 11, at 6.
19. David J. Garrow, Is There a Correct Way To Be Black?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, § 7
(Book Review), at 1.
20. Stephen L. Carter, I Am An Affirmative Action Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at AI3.
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quo. 21
The best example I have encountered of the inability of people to
understand Patricia Williams's story was the reaction of a white liberal
colleague whom I induced to read her book. This is a person of much
goodwill and good humor. He told me that he found the book irritating
and ultimately unpersuasive. He compared her work to some of mine
and found hers much less persuasive. It is clear that Professor Williams
deserves the high praise and favor that she has garnered in parts of the
legal community, praise and honor that I do not ever expect to obtain,
but many colleagues have told me of their similarly negative reaction to
her work.2 2 They simply cannot hear the story she is telling. It is too
black, too feminist, and too full of the power of the story of black wo-
man. It requires readers to understand the possibility of powerlessness
and to be able to put themselves in the position of the disadvantaged, but
that is something that majority scholars often are unable to do. It is not
that they cannot read the words, but that they cannot hear a cognizable
story. What this colleague convinced me of is that my story is easier on
the ears of white scholars precisely because it comes across as un-
threatening and therefore as understandable. This is ultimately discour-
aging because it says that precisely when we are most able to evoke truth
within our stories as people of color it will be difficult for people to hear
them.
As part of the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution several
springs ago, I had the opportunity to give a speech at East Carolina Uni-
21. Alchemy of Race and Rights was not reviewed for several months after publication and
then was negatively reviewed in the New York Times. See Wendy Kaminer, Citizens of the Super-
market State, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 7 (Book Review), at 10. The law review criticism simi-
larly has been somewhat less than laudatory. See, e.g., Jean B. Elshtain, Alchemy and the Law: Why
This Marriage Can't Be Saved, 25 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1171 (1992) (book review).
This is, perhaps, the most labile text I have ever encountered.
... Williams's alchemical science works in reverse, transforming something precious-the
rule of law and the equality of political standing that is the law's raison d'etre-into something
common. Williams's hotch-potch of particularistic meanderings privilege one voice: her own.
Id. at 1171-72. But see Robin West, Lives in the Law: Murdering the Spirit: Racism, Rights, and
Commerce, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1771, 1771 (1992) ("This is a book that we should celebrate: it re-
minds us that books are occasionally very, very important, that reading can be transformative, and
that writing sometimes can be and should always strive to be a moral act of the highest order.");
Linda Greene, "Breaking Form ", 44 STAN. L. REV. 909, 909, 924 (1992) ("In the dry desert of legal
scholarship, The Alchemy of Race and Rights is an oasis of colorful and thought provoking work....
After Alchemy, can we teach the law without acknowledging the charades of legal objectivity? I
think not."). Even some of the reviews by black women have been less than laudatory or, in my
view, understanding of the difficult issues Williams raises and treats. See, e.g., Maria O'Brien Hyl-
ton, Personal Narratives and Racial Distinctiveness in the Legal Academy, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1407
(1992).
22. I was recently struck by the power of Professor Williams's voice when, at a conference at
the Friday Center at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, she spoke at the plenary session
of the tenth anniversary session of the Women's Center at Duke and UNC. She addressed a vast,
overflowing room of eminent female and male scholars from all over the country, including scholars
of history, literature, sociology, and women's studies. She clearly is a person whose message tran-
scends the legal academy. Her talk was the basis of much that followed in the remarks of other
eminent speakers and in the discussion groups.
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versity. As my contribution to this celebratory moment, I debated the
question of affirmative action. In the period leading up to my speech, I
had become more and more convinced that black legal scholarship was
something that had an important potential to change the legal academy.
I called my talk The Myth of the Free Negro: Affirmative Action in the
Age of Dan Quayle and Robert Bork, and I hoped to have a transforma-
tive impact on the lives of the white and black people of eastern North
Carolina. I delivered this talk with all of the fervor that I have inherited
from my baptist minister forbears and all of the style that elite education
can sometimes provide. In short, this was a talk both cogent and mov-
ing, emotional and informative, and a talk that I thought would trans-
form my audience. The more sophisticated among you can already
anticipate the failure of these goals, but how it failed has stuck with me
as a repository of the potential responses of black people to calls for
transformative action.
There were three black responses to my speech. The first was from a
young black man, who said something like, "We wouldn't need to be
race conscious if we could simply become blind to racial difference." He
went on to add, "I do not look at race and I treat all people alike and if
we simply convince others of the efficacy of this, truth and justice will
reign in the land." (The last part may be a slight exaggeration; I may be
confusing the end of my speech with his response.) The second response
was from a black woman who spoke for a very long time. She told a tale
of woe associated with being a black person at East Carolina, which is
located in an area of North Carolina near the beach with few native black
people. This young woman, who came to East Carolina from New York,
encountered an environment filled with implicit and explicit racism that
robbed her first of dignity and eventually of sanity. She had found her-
self after being lost in this insanity. She was going to tell her tale of woe
on the Oprah Winfrey Show and help the other obviously still insane
black people to achieve the same level of peace that she had only recently
discovered through her experiences. The third response was from a
slightly older black man at the back of the room near the end of the
ninety-minute question and answer period. He said, "All of these re-
sponses were okay but we will never be really free until and unless we
find God. If you have found God, then you know that nothing that
white people do to black people can hurt them."
In these three responses we can see the stories and transformative
reaction of black people to racial oppression. Some black people react
like the first respondent and assume that if they can somehow find the
color-blind solution then race as an issue will go away. This is the re-
sponse of the black middle class. We insist that we made it without the
benefit of color. Somehow Colin Powell became the first black head of
the Joint Chiefs without being black. Steven Carter is just a Yale Law
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Professor, not a black professor of law.23 This is the safest response.
Yet, it is a response that requires of black people the almost superhuman
feat of being seen by others as black, and consumed by their racial ani-
mus, and seen by themselves as colorless.24 The black assistant prosecu-
tor who was one of two active prosecutors in the prosecution of the
police officers who beat Rodney King adopted this view when he argued
that he was willing to try the case anywhere, including predominately
white Simi Valley.25 Stephen Carter's book has at its heart this story,
and it has a powerful call on the ears of the majority professorate. They
can understand his claim that black people are forced by race-conscious
efforts to be seen as black as the ultimate trump that renders all race-
conscious efforts somehow suspect. The third response has also been typ-
ical of the American black intelligentsia. Black people have often used
religion as a way of coping with an inhospitable world. 26 The respectable
23. See supra note 11; see also THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGE-
DIES (1969); SHELBY STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990).
24. One of the most moving passages in The Alchemy of Race and Rights is the discussion of
how to deal with a white acquaintance who tells you they do not see you as black. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 4, at 9-11.
25. This may have been less a reflection of the prosecutor's naivete than of his understanding
that he had to assert that kind of naivete. See Henry Weinstein, White Says Jury Was the Worst
Possible, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at A3.
White [the black prosecutor on the case] acknowledged saying publicly that the prosecution
could get a fair trial in Ventura County after [Judge] Weisberg announced that the case would
be moved there. But he said it would have been impolitic to say anything else and the statement
belied private worries.
White said that he and six other members of the district attorney's staff agonized over
which potential jurors they wanted. They reviewed responses submitted by 264 potential jurors
and rated them on a "I-to-5 scale, with 1 being best and 5 being worst," he said.
"There were only 27 'Is' and '2s' on the entire list, and none of them got on the jury,"
White said. He said he never before tried a case where he did not get any of his preferred
choices on the jury.
In fact, he said that there were so many "5s" on his list that he wound up elevating some of
them to "4s" because he had to differentiate between potentially bad and truly undesirable
jurors.
Id. at A4.
26. Religion's power to free slaves goes back to the very beginning of European settlement in
North America. At common law, it was illegal to enslave a Christian and to prevent the freeing of
slaves, so slave owners first excluded Christian missionaries from slaves and eventually persuaded
missionaries that slavery was a better protection than freedom for blacks. FORREST G. WOOD, THE
ARROGANCE OF FAITH 116, 125 (1990). I want to emphasize that I am not contending that reli-
gious faith has never had nor that it never can have a powerful positive impact. Certainly, black
churches have played a crucial role as educators and supporters of change, but it is also clearly true
that religion has been used by society as a means of controlling black people's anger and distrust of
the current system. One commentator wrote:
White preachers. . . held authority partly by virtue of being white and often partly by virtue of
a slaveholder's permission to preach a nonrevolutionary version of the gospel believed to im-
prove slaves' productivity .... For blacks, black preachers were "black like me," giving them a
unique religious power base which the successful God-made Moses protected from the very
likely danger of becoming too identified with Pharaoh's interests. Such men continually af-
firmed, in joint and clandestine settings, their identification with the liberating black Christian
community.
Katharine L. Dvorak, After Apocalypse, Moses, in MASTERS & SLAVES IN THE HOUSE OF THE
LORD: RACE AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1740-1870, at 173, 174-75 (John B. Boles
ed., 1988).
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response is to find a different kind of religion in the natural processes of
the world. This too has occurred in intellectual discourse.27
Majority scholars can hear those versions of the stories that black
people tell. Many majority scholars have bought Stephen Carter's book
on affirmative action (not all have read it, but even those with unread
copies assume they know what it says). The notion of a society that is
able to get beyond race in meaningful ways is a powerful story to tell to
majority scholars, because it does not require any change from them.
Similarly, the story of religious faith in the natural processes of our cul-
ture is also a story that majority scholars find powerful and enlightening.
If natural processes have produced goodness, then any current evil will
ultimately be eliminated by these natural processes. I think this is how
majority scholars hear the claims of black scholars even when the claims
of black scholars are more nuanced and sophisticated than what is heard.
Black people are permitted both of these responses; indeed, those in the
academy who adopt them are likely to find substantial support from the
white community. These responses are united by their failure to threaten
the status quo directly. They are meant to be transformative, but in some
distant nirvana. These responses are also joined by their lack of any em-
pirical or theoretical basis. The theory that ignoring race will lead us to
racial justice is never supported by empirical evidence that it has done so
for blacks, or any other group for that matter, or by a real theoretical
model that would support such a claim. These responses are, in different
ways, leaps of political and moral faith in the current system. These
faiths inhabit our models of the world with little contradiction and no
protest that they are unscientific.
The second response is different. It attempts to use the observation
of one black life to change the way we look at the world. It was the least
persuasive response to my talk at East Carolina because it was both un-
wise and lacking in style,28 but, as pure science, it was a better model of
potential transformative power than either religion or the color-blind
myth. This response possessed both information and an effort to test her
one experience against the world. This response is also common. We
often require of black people supportive narratives of the way in which it
is possible to overcome hardship in the world. The story told in Patricia
Williams's book has turned this second transformative potential into a
27. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons
from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991) (suggesting that a neutral standard similar to the
one used to approve patents can permit faculties to evaluate potential colleagues and allow for inclu-
sion of blacks and other excluded groups); THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES (1981).
Dr. Sowell is black and an economist. He argues that the market will protect the interests of black
people and naturally permit them to progress as other ethnic groups have. See id.
28. "Is it by chance that hysteria (significantly derived, as is well known, from the Greek word
for 'uterus') was originally conceived as an exclusively female complaint, as the lot and prerogative
of women?" Shoshana Felman, Women and Madness: The Critical Phallacy, in THE FEMINIST
READER 133, 133 (Catherine Belsey & Jane Moore eds., 1989). It may be that I have not completely
shed my patriarchal prejudices and thus perceived the black woman speaker as odd when she was
simply responding to racism at Eastern Carolina in ways I did not appreciate.
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reality that-if we are willing to listen-can alter the way we see the
world. She is the madwoman telling her story. Professor Williams's
story will not permit us to misunderstand the power of the black experi-
ence, and, in so doing, it changes the reality that exists. After reading
this book, we who do law cannot see the easy platitudes of Supreme
Court justices about justice or equality in the same way. Her work has
helped to free me to speak about the madness in the law and the legal
academy. But her story has also left many of my majority colleagues at
sea in her madness. Professor Williams reinforces this notion of madness
through her description of her dreams and fear. She confesses to being
"out of sync" with the status quo. It is that fact of being oppositional
that makes her work so challenging to understand. As the reaction to
the works of Stephen Carter and others suggests, however, work that
appropriates the traditional forms of scholarship also runs the risk of
being misunderstood.
IV. WHITE SCHOLARS' CONFUSION WITH ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGH7S
A. The Know Question
Arthur: ... It is good not to be guided by experience and experiment
alone!
Jack: But what will guide us? Faith?
Arthur: No-we are scientists, so we shall try to use arguments.
Now the arguments we need will take observations into account but
will not give them final authority.29
How do we decide that we know something? This is an old philo-
sophical question and an important issue. In Alchemy of Race and
Rights, Professor Williams challenged our most basic assumptions about
that question. She offered the following example:
C. ordered a hamburger and a glass of milk. The milk was sour, and
C. asked for another. The waitress ignored her. C. asked twice
more and was ignored each time. When the waitress finally brought
the bill, C. had been charged for the milk and refused to pay for it.
The waitress started to shout at her, and a highway patrolman
walked over from where he had been sitting and asked what was
going on. C. explained that the milk was sour and that she didn't
want to pay for it. The highway patrolman ordered her to pay and
get out. When C. said he was out of his jurisdiction, the patrolman
pulled out his gun and pointed it at her.
("Don't you think" asks C. when I show her this much of my
telling of her story, "that it would help your readers to know that
the restaurant was all white and that I'm black?" "Oh, yeah," I say.
"And six feet tall.")
29. PAUL K. FEYERABEND, THREE DIALOGUES ON KNOWLEDGE 7-8 (1991).
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Now C. is not easily intimidated and, just to prove it, she put
her hand on her hip and invited the police officer to go ahead and
shoot her, but before he did so he should try to drink the damn glass
of milk, and so forth and so on for a few more descriptive
rounds....
[After being surrounded by eight SWAT team members] C.
says she doesn't remember how she got out of there alive or why
they finally let her go; she supposes that the black man paid for her.
... "[tihe damnedest thing about it," C. said, "was that no one was
interested in whether or not I was telling the truth. The glass was
sitting there in the middle of all this, with the curdle hanging on the
sides, but nobody would taste it because a black woman's lips had
touched it."
I think of C. a lot when I write, and of her truth-telling glass of
sour, separated milk. The curd clinging to the sides; her words cur-
dled in the air. The police with guns drawn, battlelines drawn, the
contest over her contestation; the proof of the milk in the glass inad-
missible, unaccounted for, unseen. 30
It is the object of Professor Williams's book to make the real evi-
dence in the lives of black people cognizable and admissible in legal set-
tings. She shows how law and legal scholarship continually ignore the
real experiences of black people in the world. Her most famous example
is how the University of Miami Law Review attempted to ignore much of
what she said about her exclusion from a clothing store (Benetton). Pro-
fessor Williams wrote about the ignominy associated with the use of the
infamous buzzer system 31 by the young white store clerk to exclude her.
Her pain was only heightened by the review editors' insistence that the
review had a policy against the publication of a person's physiognomy:
"I realize," wrote one editor, "that this was a very personal experi-
ence, but any reader will know what you must have looked like
when standing at that window.". . . "It's irrelevant," another editor
explained in a voice gummy with soothing and patience; "It's nice
and poetic," but it doesn't "advance the discussion of any principle
... This is a law review, after all."...
Ultimately I did convince the editors that mention of my race
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 56-57.
3 1. The buzzer system has been most famous as used at urban jewelry stores. An article in the
Washington Post Magazine by Richard Cohen defending the buzzer system and the people who use
it, Richard Cohen, Closing the Door on Crime, WASH. PosT, Sept. 7, 1986, (Magazine), at 13, pro-
duced a storm of protest. This included a minisymposium on the issue in The New Republic with a
number of authors supporting it (Walter E. Williams, a black economist who found the buzzer
system an efficient use of information; Rhonda Schoem, a presumably white woman who wrote in
the voice of her father, a jewelry store owner; Roger Starr, a New York Times editorial writer who
identified several "categories of suspicion," including male sex and black skin) and a few who were
opposed. See The Jeweler's Dilemma: How Would You Respond?, THE NEw REPUaLic, Nov. 10,
1986, at 18-22. But, as the editorial appended to this colloquy pointed out, "Among our contribu-
tors.... [all] fail[] to note that it's illegal. A jewelry store, as a public accommodation, is forbidden
to discriminate on the basis of race under the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 21-22.
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was central to the whole sense of the subsequent text; that my story
became one of extreme paranoia without the information that I am
black; or that it became one in which the reader had to fill in the gap
by assumption, presumption, prejudgment, or prejudice. What was
most interesting to me in this experience was how the blind applica-
tion of principles of neutrality, through the device of omission, acted
either to make me look crazy or to make the reader participate in
old habits of cultural bias.32
The question that is posed by Professor Williams's story is why it cannot
be believed. The first time she published this story the Miami Law Re-
view editors refused her offer to provide an affidavit of her experience,
and removed her reference to Benetton out of fear of a lawsuit.33 This
episode poses difficult questions about how we create facts. Her affidavit
was rejected but, as she points out, an inaccurate story about her experi-
ence published by a newspaper would be authoritative. She is involved
and therefore untrustworthy, but, as she notes, perhaps a neutral white
bystander would be sufficient. These and other stories point out how
much the configuration of what counts as important, true, and real is a
product of assumptions of power over the stories that people tell. We
disempower people without power or people with stories that are discom-
forting to the majority. Professor Williams makes us face the limitations
associated with those choices. She helps us to see her brown face pushed
up against a store window and the white curdle of milk, sights that exist
only in the unappreciated minds of black and poor people, and finally to
relate those images to some of the notions about equality and equal op-
portunity that are part of the legal discourse. Of course it is not possible
to tell all possible stories; the power of this book is how much it demon-
strates that black people have stories that would change how we see the
world and legal questions.
I am reminded of the need for such knowledge from the reaction of
my colleagues to the Benetton story. One colleague said that Professor
Williams's response was not "lawyer-like":
No lawyer I know would have assumed that the actions of a
seventeen year old store clerk were reflective of the actual policies of
Benetton. She should have gone to the store clerk's supervisor, writ-
ten to the company headquarters, or sued, but she should not have
responded by putting up a poster board and writing about it in her
diary. These are not the responses of a lawyer.
I take it my colleague means that the responses are not real or im-
portant or effective. What my colleague does not acknowledge is that the
lawyer story that she favors rests on a lot of assumptions. My colleague
32. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 47-48 (second omission in original).
33. In the unapproved version published in the Miami Law Review, Benetton is not mentioned.
See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's
Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987). Professor Williams described this failure in a
private conversation with me.
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is assuming that complaints carefully carried out in appropriate order
will change the world. The truth is that this is often not true of issues
involving race. What my colleague wants Professor Williams to do as a
lawyer is act like my colleague, a white privileged law professor, would
have acted. Professor Williams's point is that in her reality such actions
are often not effective. Indeed, a lot more people know about this inci-
dent than would have known about it if she had simply been "lawyer-
like."34 The unstated premise of this comment is that Professor Williams
was not fair to Benetton. Assume that Benetton is fair, my colleague
unconsciously requires of Professor Williams. This assumption-that
most white people are fair-is often made by the law,35 but it is wrong
and unscientific. If my colleagues in the legal academy are to increase
their knowledge of the racial experience of black litigants and citizens,
they must begin to listen to people like Professor Williams on knowledge.
B. The Power of the Word 36
Professor Williams's prolific scholarship stands among the most im-
portant new works in the legal academy. It gets much of its power from
the way that her words give meaning to the ordinary and animate the
unobvious. Her ears hear a different decibel level and her eyes see into
the nooks and crannies of our everyday experience. Her book suggests
that it must be difficult to be Patricia Williams; she sees and knows more
than most of us are willing to appreciate (but I am sure that Professor
34. Indeed, the posting of the board on the window may have been a wonderful act of legal
gamesmanship. In order to respond, the store must either sue Professor Williams for libel, or it must
disclaim the actions of the store clerk. Either way, the response is likely to be more chilling of this
type of activity because of the cost of responding. At the heart of my colleague's reaction is a view
that appropriate behavior for a lawyer is about professional responsibility rather than commitment
to the fairness of everyday life. See Cuip, supra note 12 (white colleagues often require black faculty
to adhere to a view of the academy that ignores black reality and requires allegiance to the system).
Professor Williams and lots of black people and women do not agree with that view and they are not
mad.
35. In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the majority made lots of
assumptions about what it knew about discrimination. The Court said the set-aside of subcontract-
ing dollars seemed to rest largely on "the unsupported assumption that white prime contractors
simply will not hire minority firms." Id. at 502. The Court found it "clear that the factual predicate
offered in support of the Richmond Plan suffers from the same two defects identified as fatal in
Wygant.... None of these 'findings,' singly or together, provide the city of Richmond with a 'strong
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.' " Id. at 498-500 (quoting
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The problem with
the Court's view is that it assumed there was no discrimination in the contracting business, an as-
sumption that conflicts with most historical and practical understanding of contracting practices.
The Court knew that in fact no one contested that there was little substantive participation of blacks
in the city's contracting business. Id. at 503. It repeatedly noted the reality of discrimination
against blacks, but held the city could not try to remedy discrimination against blacks without more
proof of discrimination. Id. at 505. We often make assumptions about what we know without
dealing with the racial perspective out of which those assumptions grow.
36. The notion of the "word" is an old and powerful concept in the black community. To
speak the word means to bring truth and learning and the power associated with those concepts to
the conversation. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy As Scholarship
As Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992).
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Williams would respond that it must be difficult not to be Patricia Wil-
liams and to therefore be blind and deaf to much of the racial comedy
played out in our society). Her power is not just in the knowing-many
black people know as much as she does about the world. Her power is in
her ability to reshape the images of the present into more powerful exper-
iences. My colleague Walter Dellinger also is a great story teller. He has
been described as a person who can tell a story so powerful that you
wished you had been there, and at the end you realize you were. Simi-
larly, Professor Williams is able to teach powerfully about the mundane
and the profane experiences of black people in everyday America and to
make those experiences pertinent to our legal scholarship.
Professor Williams's ability to craft the word is the reason her work
has been so influential and important. There is no better writer in Amer-
ican legal education than Patricia Williams. Some who read her work
are persuaded that it is simply about style. She recently has begun to
acknowledge her own discomfort with a particular element of almost
pornographic interest in the beauty of her work.37 Yet stories without
appropriate craft cannot be heard any more than a difficult diagram can
be deciphered or an obtuse article can be understood.
In order to flesh out these issues, I want to discuss a couple of exam-
ples from her book. She wrote:
Some time ago, Peter Gabel and I taught a contracts class to-
gether .... Both recent transplants from California to New York,
each of us hunted for apartments in between preparing for class.
Inevitably, I suppose, we got into a discussion of trust and distrust
as factors in bargain relations. It turned out that Peter had handed
over a $900 deposit in cash, with no lease, no exchange of keys, and
no receipt, to strangers with whom he had no ties other than a few
moments of pleasant conversation....
I, meanwhile, had friends who found me an apartment in a
building they owned. In my rush to show good faith and trustwor-
thiness, I signed a detailed, lengthily negotiated, finely printed lease
firmly establishing me as the ideal arm's-length transactor.
... [A]s a black, I have been given by this society a strong sense
of myself as already too familiar, personal, subordinate to white
people ....
In addition to our different word usage, Peter and I had quali-
tatively different experiences of rights. For me to understand fully
the color my sister saw when she looked at a road involved more
than my simply knowing that her "purple" meant my "black." It
required as well a certain slippage of perception that came from my
finally experiencing how much her purple felt like my black ....
37. Patricia J. Williams, The Jogger Trial, Talk Given to Duke Faculty (Nov. 30, 1992).
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In Peter's and my case, such a complete transliteration of each
other's experience is considerably harder to achieve. If it took years
for me to understand my own sister, probably the best that Peter
and I can do-as friends and colleagues, but very different people-
is to listen intently to each other so that maybe our children can
bridge the experiential distance. Bridging such gaps requires listen-
ing at a very deep level, to the uncensored voices of others.3"
Many things have been said about passages like this in her work.39
The most important negative comment is that this is not law. In recent
years, however, professors have increasingly recognized the interrelation-
ship between law and other academic disciplines, and between law and
the broader experiences of life. If law professors choose to teach about
these interdisciplinary concerns, they begin to become law. As judges
and lawyers decide to respond to these concerns, they become an integral
part of legal discourse. There is, however, a deeper level at which the
understanding of how the law treats marginal people is important for all
of us as lawyers to listen to and to understand. The voices that she spoke
about in that last line-bridging such gaps requires listening at a very deep
level, to the uncensored voices of others-are often black, female, or both,
and they often are not included in the legal discourse. Professor Wil-
liams's voice is unique in that many people are able to understand the
nonincluded issues that she raised. One of my white male students de-
scribed his response to one of Patricia Williams's articles this way:
This seems to me to be what black legal scholarship is about. The
article shows considerable literary style while combining an atten-
tion to legal detail with the experiential exigencies of modern black
life. She brings to bear a psychology which illuminates the law
without reducing it to triviality. Perhaps more importantly, however,
she caused me to think about things I had not considered before. "
This response is typical of the response that I get from my students,
black and white, about the nature of law and race. All of us seek to have
our students think about heretofore unconsidered arguments. Some, like
myself, often push our students to consider the economic constraints that
exist in the world. Others help our students understand the tax code's
beauty and symmetry or the ways in which contract and corporate law fit
together. All of these things are important, but that does not mean that
38. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 146-50.
39. Among the least responsive and ultimately silly reactions to this discussion of contract by
one of my colleagues was the claim that Peter Gabel is crazy. This reaction missed the point of the
discussion. Professor Williams is reacting to the tendency of some white crits to see informality and
the lack of rules as universally positive. It is not fair to simply dismiss this metaphor for critical
legal scholarship without understanding its metaphorical quality.
40. An example of how important the source of a voice can be comes from my use of a white
male student to provide support for the transformative potential of Professor Williams's book. He
implicitly refutes the argument that only blacks or women will be concerned about what she has
written. It is equivalent to black people being asked to testify about situations where someone else
fears being charged with racism. It is, in short, a trick we often play to protect ourselves when we
are not sure that the audience will believe our own "biased" voice.
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we can be satisfied that they alone are sufficient to provide our students
with the edification that they need.
To see the power of the word in the hands of Professor Williams,
compare the following quotation from George Fletcher's influential book
on the Goetz trial, A Crime of Self-Defense,41 with a passage by Professor
Williams. Professor Fletcher argued:
Ironically, as Goetz was engaged in systematically flouting the law
suppressing guns in New York City, he thought that his would-be
muggers would be deterred from violating the same law. He did not
fear that they, as professional petty thieves, would be armed. He
knew that they would ply their lawless trade without incurring the
high costs of state prison. In his revealing testimony at the trial,
Troy Canty confirmed the capacity that he and his friends had for
engaging in rational calculation about the penal costs of particular
crimes. If petty thieves are deterred and Goetz was sufficiently
street-wise to realize this, why was he not deterred on December 22,
1984, and the innumerable occasions prior to that date that he left
his apartment with a loaded gun in his quick-draw holster? The
simple answer is that Goetz thought he was right. The four youths
knew they were engaged in an illegal enterprise, and they saw no
reason to take unnecessary risks. But Goetz believed firmly that the
law as applied to him was wrong. The issue for him was not arming
himself with an instrument of illegal gain, but equipping himself
with a necessary means of self-protection.42
Much of Professor Fletcher's book is moving and increases the under-
standing of the deep racism that existed beneath the disposition of Bern-
hard Goetz's case. In the ultimate chapter entitled Mixed Messages,43
however, Fletcher could not separate himself from the white occasional
victims of black youths. He saw the rights and wrongs only from that
perspective. The black youths who engage in crime become caricatures
of real people. Professor Fletcher allowed Bernhard Goetz to assume a
position of right in comparison to these black victims of his violence, a
position that is not warranted by what they say or how they describe
themselves. Black youths who are discriminated against in the world feel
that taking change from white strangers is as fair as carrying around a
loaded gun and using that gun to shoot people. By saying this, I am not
saying they are right any more than Bernhard Goetz was right, but that
the objective and subjective realities of both groups must be understood.
The anger of some of these black victims about the outcome, like their
decision not to carry a weapon, is not inchoate or unformed, but rather a
realistic vision of a world in which black youths are much more likely
than whites to be sent to prison for any given offense.
41. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE (1988).
42. Id. at 214-15.
43. Id. at 199-217.
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Listen to Professor Williams's concern with a different aspect of this
issue. She argued:
One of the reasons I fear what I call spirit murder--disregard for
others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard-is that it
produces a system of formalized distortions of thought. It produces
social structures centered on fear and hate, a tumorous outlet for
feelings elsewhere unexpressed. When Bernhard Goetz shot four
black teenagers in a New York subway, J., an acquaintance of mine,
said she could "understand his fear because it's a fact that blacks
commit most of the crimes." Actually U.S. Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics for 1986 show that whites were arrested for 71.7 percent of all
crimes; blacks and all others (including American Indian, Alaskan
Native, Asian, and Pacific Islander) account for the remaining 28
percent. Furthermore, there is evidence that "whites commit more
crimes, and that white offenders have consistently lower probabili-
ties of arrest, than do either blacks or Mexican-Americans. This is
particularly striking for armed robbery and burglary." But, "Con-
trolling for the factors most likely to influence sentencing and parole
decisions, the analysis still found that blacks and Hispanics are less
likely to be given probation, more likely to receive prison sentences,
more likely to receive longer sentences, and more likely to serve
longer time." What impressed me, beyond the factual inaccuracy
of J.'s statement, was the reduction of Goetz's crime to "his fear,"
which I translate to mean her fear; the four teenage victims became
all blacks everywhere; and "most of the crimes" clearly meant, in
order for the sentence to make sense, that most blacks commit
crimes. (Some have taken issue with my interpretation of J.'s re-
marks. They point out that what she must have meant was that
young black men are arrested and convicted for a disproportionate
number of the muggings committed in the New York subway sys-
tem. Looking past the fact that this is not what she said, and that it
is precisely the unframed nature of what she did say that is the
source of my concern, I am left wondering what the real point of
such a criticism is: should the assumed specificity of reference there-
fore give white subway riders a license to kill based on the empiri-
cism of "statistical fear"?)
What struck me, further, was that the general white population
seems, in the process of devaluing its image of black people, to have
blinded itself to the horrors inflicted by white people. One of the
clearest examples of this socialized blindness is the degree to which
Goetz's victims were relentlessly bestialized by the public and by the
media in New York: images of the urban jungle, with young black
men filling the role of "wild animals," were favorite journalistic con-
structions; young white urban professionals were mythologized, usu-
ally wrapped in the linguistic apparel of lambs or sheep, as the
tender, toothsome prey....
... Some do not even recognize white criminality when it does
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happen; they apologize for the assailant, think it must have been
their fault; they misperceived the other's intent....
... [I]n the famous videotape Bernhard Goetz described to po-
lice in New Hampshire his intention to inflict as much harm as he
could. He detailed his wish to see his victims dead; said if he had it
to do over again, he'd do the same or worse; and expressed a retro-
spective desire to have gouged their eyes out. Yet in finding him not
guilty [of the major non-gun crimes] the jury discounted this confes-
sion entirely: "We felt he said a lot of things he was unsure about.
He had nine days of thinking about what happened and reading
newspapers, and combined with the guilt, we felt that he may have
gotten confused. His own confusion coupled with his feelings of
guilt might have forced him to make statements that were not
accurate."44
Professor Williams addressed a very different question from the issues
that animate the heart of Professor Fletcher's book-length discussion of
the Goetz case. Some contend that she missed the important point, ad-
dressed at great length in Fletcher's book, that the "strange" law of New
York forced the jury to look at the subjective intent of Bernhard Goetz
and provided an opportunity for the jury (one has to read, free of "un-
due" racial prejudice) to find that he lacked the necessary legal intent.
Professor Williams's point was that this is the wrong question. It is not
that the jury deliberated about the lack of intent free of the notions of
race inherent in making the four unarmed youths predators and Bern-
hard Goetz innocent. Professor Williams asked us to require the jury to
insist Bernhard Goetz leave the bullets in his gun at his apartment where
they could do no harm or to leave them in the gun rather than scattered
among the bodies of the four black victims. Professor Williams wanted
us to understand that the "real" issue is not irrelevant, but that it is not
the only place from which the legal discussion can begin. Professor
Fletcher told how traditional doctrinal categories cramped the jury's de-
liberations. Professor Williams argued that the traditional doctrinal po-
sition is not sufficient to understand the place of race in the Goetz trial or
in law in general. This is about law because it is directed at the most
important issues in these cases. If the judges are going to deal effectively
with the racism in the courts, they have to ask the question posed by
Professor Williams as well as the one that drives Professor Fletcher.
A more important question that can be raised is whether this ap-
proach of including extensive discussion of media sources and autobio-
graphical reaction is important or scholarly. It is clear that in literary
studies this is an important issue.45 Professor Williams has become an
important player in this intellectual discourse. Her work touches impor-
44. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 73-76 (footnotes omitted).
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM RAY, STORY AND HISTORY (1990) (discussion of the rise of the use of
authority and narratives as political and literary tools in history and literature).
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tantly on feminism, literary criticism, and race and the law.4  The heart
of what she has done is to create a genre of inclusion that permits the
author to demand attention from those in authority who often ignore the
pleas at the margin. Her use of the power of autobiography is consistent
with the descriptions of the use of that genre in literary studies.47 One of
the reasons why this technique resonates so deeply in black intellectual
discourse is that black Americans have been required to use that tech-
nique to obtain attention.4" Her work is clearly imaginative and impor-
tant, in a number of disciplines. It is also important to remember that, at
times in the past, the courts have paid more attention to these kinds of
alternative sources. The power of the word has been a consistently im-
portant issue throughout the legal history of America. The definition of
what counts is always contextual and dependent on the issues that are
being raised by decisionmakers. Professor Williams translated her exper-
iences into words of beauty and power. It is this beauty that sometimes
seduces without transforming, but without the beauty there can be no
change.
Some are likely to conclude that this book is too self-indulgent.
"Professor Williams tells us the experiences of the black middle class and
this book becomes simply the rumblings of someone who ought to be
psychoanalyzed and not listened to," they say.49 Such arguments miss
the real power of her voice. Professor Williams is as questioning of her
own motivations as she is of those of any of the other people who appear
in her stories. She questions everything from her own ability to deal with
student complaints as a professor to her response to antisemitism by
black acquaintances. Professor Williams sometimes will not let a white
friend off the hook for a casual comment, but she is just as unrelenting on
her black friends and herself. The power of the word in this book is not a
46. See, e.g., BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA (Micheline R. Malson et al. eds., 1990) (collection
of women writers on black women featuring one of Professor Williams's articles); CONSEQUENCES
OF THEORY (Jonathan Arac & Barbara Johnson eds., 1991) (collection of articles in literature, phi-
losophy, religion and law addressing the practical uses of theory by specialists in African-American,
American, English, feminist and postcolonial studies, including an article by Professor Williams);
RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (collection of essays by emi-
nent intellectuals, including Professor Williams, about the impact of the Thomas nomination and
hearings on the black community).
47. See, e.g., PHILIPPE LEJEUNE, ON AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1989).
48. See THE SLAVE'S NARRATIVE (Charles T. Davis & Henry L. Gates eds., 1985) (collection
of essays and reviews describing the use of largely autobiographical materials by African-American
people from slavery through the early New Deal); Henry L. Gates, Introduction to BEARING WIT-
NESS: SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN-AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
at i (Henry L. Gates ed., 199 1) (autobiography has been one of the major contributions of blacks to
literary discourse and this effort has been long lasting and important).
49. For a similar prescription and the value of such advice offered to a fictional character, see
the interesting review of DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) by Richard Delgado in the Yale Law Journal. Richard Delgado, Derrick
Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (book
review).
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collection of self-serving pats on the back, but a forceful demand for re-
sponse, reflection, and-ultimately--change in the legal academy.
Professor Williams's voice makes us think about the issue of the in-
teraction of race and the law in ways that most of us do not confront. It
is challenging, difficult, and sometimes raises issues that many of us
would rather not deal with, but these are real issues faced by real clients
in the real world of the law. It may have been appropriate to avoid such
an education thirty years ago when law schools had few women and
black students and no women or black faculty, but it is time to alter
"some" of what we do. Some of my colleagues in the academy hear this
statement and substitute "all" for "some." Others seem to believe that if
we have some people doing this it must mean that they will have to stop
writing about torts, antitrust, property, or corporations in the ways that
they have. Nothing in Professor Williams's work requires that law
professors stop doing what they are doing. Those who listen to the real
Professor Williams will hear someone who also believes that traditional
teaching has a place in the legal academy.
Why does her writing, particularly the autobiographical aspects of
her writing, have such poignancy? The answer is that autobiography is
always present in our work. We often assume something about an au-
thor's history, including race, culture, and background, without dealing
with the consequences of that assumption.'0 Professor Williams makes
us deal with those consequences without requiring that we stand in her
shoes. This quality of requiring us to hear the deep voice of others with-
out suppressing the voices that already are present is the most important
part of her work.
There is an old Talmudic story about four rabbis who go into an
orchard. "One fell gravely ill and died, one became a heretic, one went
mad and one, Rabbi Akiba, emerged whole."51 As in all stories, there
are several possible interpretations, but what Professor Williams's book
teaches us is that there were possibly two survivors. Rabbi Akiba, who
was converted to the truth, supports traditional patterns of story and
understanding. If we are armed with and understand the truth, then no
power can defeat us. The mad rabbi may have been someone who would
not accept the assumptions of the world from which they all came and, in
not accepting that world, may still speak a truth if we can understand the
madness. So The Alchemy of Race and Rights has transformed madness
into knowledge and knowledge into a different way of looking at law, and
that is what legal scholarship must be about-but seldom is. If white
scholars are to understand some of what black scholars and people are
saying, they must begin to appreciate stories that are unconventional.
50. See generally Culp, supra note 12.
51. ARI L. GOLDMAN, THE SEARCH FOR GOD AT HARVARD 3 (1991).
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Only in the madness of the unconventional is it possible for truth to be
found-at least a truth that includes the lives and experiences of black
people.

